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Abstract 
Turkey is a geographically diverse country and two important components of that 
diversity are demography and education levels. Regions of the country vary markedly in 
the age structure of the population and even more conspicuously in such characteristics 
as fertility, mortality, and migration and the level of educational attainment. The 
purpose of this study is mainly to explore the effect of various demographic and 
education scenarios on the size and the structure of the population in five selected 
provinces that are representative of four fertility regions of Turkey. Three scenarios 
were defined namely: “Euro” in which Turkey joins European Union, “Medium” as a 
continuation of trend, and “3-Child” in which Turkey becomes more conservative. 
Based on our knowledge about the past and expectation in the future for each scenario, 
we defined set of assumptions for fertility, mortality, migration, and education and these 
assumptions  were implemented in a multi-state population projection model to project 
the population by age, sex and educational attainment in five selected provinces from 
2010 to 2050. Under all scenarios, population in the five provinces will grow between 
2010 and 2050. Under Euro and Medium scenario, the population of children will 
diminish and the population of elderly and those in the age-group 15-64 will increase in 
all scenarios. In terms of education, as expected a rapid transformation will take place 
under Euro scenarios with more homogenous and higher level of human capital across 
Turkey, whereas, under 3-Child scenario Turkey will continue to be a heterogeneous 
society with a lower level of human capital. The result of this exercise reveals the extent 
to which Turkey’s population can evolve in the future and provides policy makers and 
planners with a tool to look into the future and test the implication of certain policies 
and expectations on the development of population. 
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Demographic and Human Capital Heterogeneity in Selected 
Provinces of Turkey: A Scenario Analysis Using the Multi-
dimensional Population Projection Model 
M. Murat Yüceşahin 
Samir K.C. 
1. Introduction 
The term ‘human capital’ can be defined as the sum of competencies, knowledge, social 
and personality attributes, including creativity embodied in the ability to perform labour 
so as to produce economic value. Many theories demonstrably draw the attention to the 
relationship between investment in human capital development and education, 
economic development, productivity growth, and innovation. This relationship has 
frequently been cited as a justification for government subsidies for education and job 
skills training (Weeks, 2002). In light of human capital theory, participation in 
education can be seen as an investment in human capital made with the expectation of 
returns later in life and thus the process of education has a central role in the production 
of human capital (Becker, 1964; Smits & Hoşgör, 2006). At the macro-social level, 
more education tends to imply improved productivity and income, and economic 
development implies a better quality of life. At the micro-social level, more education 
tends to imply a healthier and better-nourished population and greater autonomy for 
women (Basu, 2002; Flandorfer & Fliegenschnee, 2010; Goujon & Lutz, 2004; 
Jejeebhoy, 1995; Joshi & David, 2006; KC et al., 2010; Lutz & Goujon, 2001; Martin & 
Juarez, 1995). 
Almost universally, women with higher levels of education demonstrably limit 
their births and in general have greater access to birth control. Typically, in all societies, 
better educated individuals or parents have lower mortality rates and their children have 
better chances of survival and attainment of education (Lutz & KC, 2011). Education is 
also an important determinant for a wide range of demographic behaviour of 
individuals, as it powerfully affects fertility, mortality, and migration (Bongaarts, 2010; 
Jejeebhoy, 1995; KC et al., 2010). This effect of education on fertility is particularly 
apparent in countries or regions that are in the early phases of their fertility transition or 
countries that have prominent regional-socio-economic and cultural differences. 
Spatially, the patterns in the relationship between education and demographic behaviour 
are diverse, varying by world region as well as by the level of socio-economic 
development and cultural conditions (Bongaarts, 2003; Jejeebhoy, 1995). These patterns 
and relationships raise certain questions, in some contexts (Turkish), about whether or 
to what extent modest increases in education, especially among females, lead to 
differences in demographic behaviour. Capturing the differences in the distribution of 
educational attainment categories and inter-cohort changes across different spatial levels 
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has a particular importance for regional development and to study the consequence of 
improving human capital on society and economy (Lutz & KC, 2011). 
Turkey has experienced many socio-economic and cultural changes in the last 
century. These changes can be seen as a “modernisation” of state, institutions and 
society, and as a whole, shaping the social structure and improving the human capital 
(Ediev, Yavuz & Yüceşahin, 2012). These significant changes can be observed in some 
of the historical-basic demographic measures of the country. At the beginning of the last 
century Turkey had a population of only 13.6 million, however, it has with a current 
population of roughly 75 million (Turkish Statistical Institute1(TSI), TSI, 2012a,b) 
Since the early 1960s, Turkey has experienced steep fertility declines, as in most other 
developing countries (Yüceşahin & Özgür, 2008). While the total fertility rate (TFR) in 
the early 1960s was around 6 children per woman, by 2012, Turkey had fallen slightly 
below replacement level, with an estimated TFR of 2.08 children per woman (TSI, 
2013b). While now still in transition, the country is widely expected to continue further 
declines in fertility levels in the near future. A number of studies note that the last 
period of demographic transition of Turkey will be completed by the middle of this 
century (Ediev, Yavuz & Yüceşahin, 2012; HUIPS, 2010; Koray, 1997; Unalan, 1997; 
Yüceşahin, 2009). 
In contrast with past demographic behaviour, Turkey has now become a country 
with low fertility and mortality rates and an ageing population (HUIPS, 2010; 
Yüceşahin, 2009). In particular, the demographic trajectory of the 2000s represents the 
final stage in Turkey’s demographic transition, ushering in a number of associated risks 
observed in Western European countries such as an ageing population and diminished 
number of working age citizens. This new status quo is largely responsible for the 
formulation of a new population policy intended to mitigate the perceived harmful 
effects of a post-transition demographic reality. Thus, the prime minister’s plea for 
women to raise at least 3 children can be seen as attempt to achieve socioeconomic and 
political goals through demographic change (Yüceşahin, Türkyılmaz & Adalı, 2013). 
Since the proclamation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, successive Turkish 
governments have implemented numerous policies and reforms in order to spread 
modernisation, to provide socio-economic development equally to all sectors of society, 
and to eliminate regional inequalities nationwide. Along these lines, for decades 
governments have also tried to expand education to small towns and rural settlements 
and organized a mass free education system. Some reforms were mainly meant to 
eliminate gender inequalities in education by increasing the proportion of educated 
girls/women, with an emphasis on ensuring that they at least had a primary school 
education (Rankin & Aytaç, 2006). 
 
                                                 
1Formerly the State Institute of statistics (SIS). 
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Figure 1. Population by education level and sex (6 years of age and over) in Turkey and 
in the provinces of Ankara and Van, 2010. 
Source: Data from TSI (2013a). 
Note: Foreigners are not included. 
As a result of these efforts, over the years the state has made remarkable 
improvements in educational opportunities. For instance, while in the 1930s only 14-15 
percent of villages had primary schools, nearly all did as of the early 1980s. Studies 
have also shown that the number of schools increased more than tenfold from 1923 to 
2000s, while the number of students and teachers both rose almost 50 percent(Gökçe, 
2004). From 1935 to 2010, literacy rates for both the male and female population also 
increased dramatically – from 29.35% to 93.45% and from 9.81% to 86.54%, 
respectively (Ergöçmen, Hancıoğlu & Ünalan, 1995; TSI, 2013a). Similarly, the 
schooling ratio for both sexes rose significantly over time. However, the gender gap in 
education attainment persists to this day, and Turkey still differs little from other 
developing countries in having low levels of education among its female population 
(Duman, 2010). Moreover, this gender gap is larger and more conspicuous in post-
primary education (Rankin & Aytaç, 2006) (Figure 1). 
Although Turkey has recently reached below replacement level fertility rates, 
there remain marked regional demographic differentials. Geographic patterns of 
variation in the country’s demographic characteristics match regional variations in the 
levels of social and economic development. The biggest disparities are related to the 
socio-economic development and regional disparities between the country's east and 
west. Provinces or regions of the country vary markedly in the age structure of the 
population and even more conspicuously in such characteristics as fertility and infant 
and child mortality (Kocaman, 2008; Yüceşahin & Özgür, 2008). For instance, fertility 
varies from high levels in some provinces or regions to below-replacement levels in 
others2 (Figure 2). 
                                                 
2In order to present these variations among the provinces, in Figure 3, all 81 provinces of the country 
were classified according to their fertility-transition stages in 2000 (SIS, 2003): provinces with TFRs 
below replacement levels were called post-transitional provinces (PTP); provinces with TFRs from 2.1 to 
2.99 were called late transitional provinces (LTP); those with TFRs from 3.0 to 4.99 were called mid-
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Figure 2. Distribution of TFRs by Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics 
(NUTS-1) regions, 2008. 
Source: Data from HUIPS (2009). 
Education differs among the provinces or regions too. Turkey is far from 
homogeneous and its differentials in the level of socioeconomic development among 
provinces continue to affect the availability of educational resources and particularly 
women’s access to them. Thus, geographic accessibility to educational and healthcare 
services, as well as ethnic composition and regional cultural patterns, exert an 
independent influence on the persistence of demographic diversity (Yüceşahin & Özgür, 
2008). In terms of educational structure, populations in some provinces (e.g. Ankara) 
have a higher level of education than in other provinces such as Van (Figure 1). 
In sum, Turkey experienced rapid educational expansion that yielded high 
upward intergenerational mobility and rapid fertility decline with decreasing fertility 
differentials by education in the course of time. This combination would be a very 
interesting implication for differential population replacement, particularly in the near 
future.  
Although recent general fertility trends, regional inequalities, and gender 
disparities in education in Turkey have been well documented in research through 
analyses of censuses and demographic sample surveys (e.g. Turkish Demographic and 
Health Surveys), demographic and human capital variability has been comparatively 
neglected. Particularly for the future, it is worthwhile to undertake a broad portrait of 
regional variation in population characteristics in the Turkish context.  
This study is a multi-state population projection, the aims of which include the 
production of a new dataset on educational attainment by age and sex for selected 
provinces in Turkey for the period 2010-2050 and the assessment of the likely effects of 
                                                                                                                                               
transitional provinces (MTP); and provinces with TFRs more than 5 children per woman were referred to 
as pre- or early transitional provinces (PETP). 
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future human capital changes in light of the three different scenarios, particularly for its 
possible impacts on the degree of heterogeneity between provinces.  
Population estimates by age and sex make up one of the most widely used 
products of demographic analyses, and these estimates and projections for geographical 
units such as states, counties, provinces are important for planning what types of 
services to offer and the future structure of populations (Hoque, 2008; Jarosz, 2008; 
Plane & Rogerson, 1994). In addition to age and sex, disaggregation of population by 
education is proposed to be an important addition (see Lutz and KC, 2011). Education-
specific population projections are important both because the information they produce 
is of intrinsic and practical interest, and because taking education into account improves 
the accuracy of the population projection in addition to allowing us to obtain 
information on the future structure of populations (KC et al., 2010). 
Our main objective is to see how the population evolves in selected provinces of 
Turkey under different future scenarios. Thus we are interested in both the size and the 
structure by age, sex, and level of educational attainment of the population for selected 
provinces in the country. The present study is based on three sets of likely future 
storylines that could likely have different effects on demographic behaviour. The 
population at the sub national levels might respond differently under different changes 
in future policies and events. In order to make projections on the future of demographics 
in these provinces, we need to understand how these phenomena change under different 
scenarios. One way the society will change in the future could be due to the current 
momentum of change or a continuation of the currently observed trend. This possibility 
can be called business as usual or simply a “Medium” scenario; we will consider this as 
a baseline scenario. Beside the momentum factor, important events either at the internal 
or international level can significantly alter societal behaviours, including the 
demographic ones. A classic example for fertility is the baby-boom and the bust in 
many countries in the West after World War II. The first of the remaining two 
alternative scenarios is “Euro” storyline, where Turkey joins the European Union (EU) 
in the near future and the second one is “3-Child" storyline, where Turkey is less likely 
to join the EU and the government continues to implement the policy of 3-Child. The 
details of these storylines and their possible impacts on future demographics are 
discussed in the following relevant sections.  
2. Approach and Methodology 
In our study, we used multi-state population projection model to project the population 
by age, sex and educational attainment in five representative provinces in Turkey. The 
multi-state projection model can be considered as a generalization of the standard 
cohort-component model, which basically is a two state model with states “live” and 
“dead”. In the cohort component model, a cohort born in a geographic region during a 
period (e.g. a five year period) is projected forward in time (Lutz et al., 2007) (Figure3). 
The size of the cohort diminishes as members emigrate or die and the size increases 
when people born in the same year living outside the country immigrate into the 
country. This is repeated for all age-groups until mortality. In addition, new members 
enter in the population as newborns to females typically of the age-group 15-49. 
Fittingly, each cohort needs to be disaggregated by sex because fertility only applies to 
women. As with fertility, the mortality and migration rates also differ by sex. The 
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results of the cohort component method therefore will be a distribution of population by 
the two basic demographic factors namely, age and sex at a specific point of time. 
 
 
Figure 3. Age and education pyramids for the province of Ankara in 2010, 2030, and 
2050.  
Note: Colours indicate highest level of educational attainment of the population. Children aged 0 to 14 are marked in gray.  
It has been shown that in addition to age and sex, population heterogeneity can 
be attributed to many other factors such as education attainment, health status, labour 
force participation, place of residence, etc. The multi-state population projection model 
is used when additional factors need to be considered in the projection of the 
population. The methodology of the multi-state model was developed in 1970s in the 
International Institute for Applied System Analysis (IIASA) (Keyfitz, 1985; Lutz & KC, 
2011; Rogers & Land, 1982). This methodology originates from a geographic 
perspective in which states are defined to be regions of a country, with the populations 
interacting through internal migration; later this approach was generalized, and states 
were defined to include marital status, health or different types of households. Lutz and 
KC (2011) demonstrate that multi-state methods are particularly appropriate for 
modelling changes in educational attainment with upward transitions from lower to 
higher attainment levels, typically concentrated at younger ages. In applying the method 
for projecting backward (reconstruction) or forward, into the future, one has to have at 
least one data point for which the size and structure of the population by age, sex, and 
level of educational attainment is available (Lutz & KC, 2011). Education specific rates 
of fertility, migration, and mortality are applied to each cohort separately for males and 
females to obtain a population projection during a period, usually of 1 or 5 years (Figure 
3). During the projection, some members of the cohort might transit to a higher 
educational attainment level. The end product is a new set of age-sex-education 
structures for a population. 
2.1. Selected Provinces 
Turkey has 81 provinces. We have selected five provinces from the 4 fertility regions by 
their TFRs level in 2000 (Figure 4). Provinces of Ankara and Izmir represent the low 
fertility (or post-transitional) region. These two provinces are developed socially and 
economically. However, Ankara has the most educated population proportionately in 
the country and Izmir is one of the provinces with the lowest fertility levels in the 
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country. Kayseri represents the mean fertility (or late transitional) region. Gaziantep 
represents the relatively high fertility (or mid-transitional) region. And Van represents 
the high fertility (or early transitional) region in the east. 
 
 
Figure 4. Fertility regions of Turkey: Distribution of post- (PTP), late (LTP), mid- 
(MTP), and pre- or early (PETP) transitional provinces in 2000 and the selected 
provinces. 
Source: Data from SIS (2003). 
Note: Selected provinces-Ankara, Gaziantep, Izmir, Kayseri, and Van- were showed with cross (X) on the map. 
We also take into account other criteria when selecting the representative 
provinces including: (i) Salient differences among the provinces in the distribution of 
population by age, sex, and the level of educational attainment; (ii) population size 
within these provinces (Figure 5); (iii) distinctive mortality and migration patterns 
among the provinces; and (iv)data availability and quality. 
Kayseri 
X 
Gaziantep 
X 
Van 
X 
İzmir 
X 
Ankara 
X 
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Figure 5. Distribution of population by age, sex and level of educational attainment in 
selected provinces in 2010. 
Source: Data from TSI (2013a). 
2.2 Raw Data 
There are no data sources that include province-specific demographics. As such, the 
data were derived from different statistical sources by different indicators as follows: As 
baseline data for the provinces we used the 2010 data for the population distribution by 
age, sex, and educational attainment, birth statistics, and internal migration from the 
Address Based Population Registration System (TSI, 2013a). Other base provincial-
population data were taken from the latest national census in 2000 (SIS, 2003, 2002a–
e), which includes information on TFRs (from 1980 to 2000 with ten-year intervals), 
infant mortality rates and population distribution by age, sex, and educational 
attainment. For detailed information about characteristics of the migrated population 
between 2000 and 2005, data were taken from the latest migration statistics based on a 
2000 national census (TSI, 2005). We used region-specific demographic data from the 
latest Turkey Demographic and Health Survey 2008 (HUIPS, 2009). For other data, life 
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tables were taken from United Nations (United Nations, 2011) and migration 
assumptions were taken from the Wittgenstein Centre (WIC).  
2.3 Scenarios 
In order to project the future population, we need to define scenarios. Typical practice is 
to have three scenarios, a middle one which represents a business as usual scenario, a 
high scenario, and a low scenario. We use three scenarios in this paper. While the 
Medium scenario is a continuation of the past or a business as usual scenario, the other 
two scenarios are based on storylines regarding potential political development in the 
future.  
2.3.1 Medium Scenario 
This is a business as usual scenario. Under this scenario we expect that the progress 
Turkey has made in the past will continue and socio-economic inequalities between 
provinces will continue to diminish. In demographic terms, fertility will continue to 
decline in all regions and reach some point of convergence in the long run. We assume 
that the current level of age-sex specific net migration rates, both internal and 
international, will remain constant till the end of the projection period, i.e., 2050. Life 
expectancy will continue increasing with some level of convergence as a continuation of 
the past. In terms of educational progression, we expect past improvement to continue 
with some level of convergence between regions. The quantification of these 
expectations are shown in Table 1. 
2.3.2 Euro Scenario 
We assume that negotiations will begin to go in a positive direction and Turkey will 
eventually join the EU within the next five or ten years. Under this scenario, many 
policies will be implemented with the goal of reducing interregional socio-economic 
and demographic inequality. We expect that with the opening of the borders there will 
be higher levels of international migration from all regions of Turkey to other European 
countries (Table 1). While international migration increases, internal migration in terms 
of net-migration will decline due to the decline in economic heterogeneity. In terms of 
fertility, we expect overall TFR to decline faster in all regions due to the transfer of 
European values that could increase the age at marriage, decrease the ideal number of 
children further, and increase the use of contraception. The mortality situation could be 
better due to technology transfers, expansion of the free market, and certain EU 
regulations. The rate of education progression gets a boost with a faster convergence 
between provinces. 
2.3.3 3-Child Scenario 
Considering demographic trends and the implemented long-term anti-natalist population 
policy from 1960s to 2000, it is evident that Turkey has moved into a new demographic 
regime since 2008. Turkey is no longer a country with high fertility, high mortality, and 
a young population; it is rather an ageing country with low fertility and low mortality. 
In response to this demographic change, policymakers began to pay attention to new 
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imbalances in the population structure (such as the increase in the elderly population), 
and began to state the need for a pronatalist population policy which would attempt to 
reverse the current trend (Eğrikavuk, 2010; Yüceşahin, Türkyılmaz & Adalı, 2013). The 
current Prime Minister, R. Tayyip Erdoğan, has a pro-life version of the one-child 
policy in China. It is his hope that each couple will have at least three children and for 
years he has promoted his own ‘three-child policy’ recommending that Turkish citizens 
should have at least three children to keep the country’s population and workforce 
dynamically youthful.  
Under the 3-Child scenario, we assume that Turkey is less likely to join the EU. 
Conservatism, religiosity, and nationalism all increase under this scenario. We expect 
that the socio-economic inequalities between provinces will grow stronger. In 
demographic terms, the three child policy will mainly affect the ideal number of 
children and contraceptive use. While the ideal number of children increases, 
contraceptive use could decline and as a result TFR will increase or remain at higher 
level (Table 1). We expect that internal migration will increase and more people will 
move to currently affluent areas such as Ankara and Izmir from places with lower levels 
of human development such as Van and Gaziantep. Due to the rising tension between 
the EU and Turkey, the EU will impose stricter rules that would lead to a decline in 
international migration. In terms of mortality, the increase in life expectancy will be 
slower than in the Medium scenario. 
11 
 
 
Scenario  Fertility Mortality Migration  
(Internal) 
Migration 
(International) 
Education 
 
 
 
Euro  
Regions with low 
fertility (TFR < 
1.75): TFR 
declines to1.3 and 
then increases to 
converge to1.75;  
Regions with 
high fertility: 
TFR will decline 
and converge to 
1.75 
Increase in life 
expectancy at birth 
(e0) in Ankara will 
be 1 year per 
decade higher than 
in the Medium 
scenario;  the 
remaining four 
provinces will 
follow Ankara’s 
path such that by 
2050 the current 
difference 
diminishes by 2/3rd 
Net migration 
rate declines 
50%more than 
in the Medium 
scenario 
Exhibits double 
the rate of age-
sex specific net-
migration than 
in the Medium 
scenario 
until2020 – 
remaining 
constant 
thereafter 
E1-E2: 99%(by 2020) 
E2-E3: 99%(by 2020) 
E3-E4: 30% faster 
than medium 
E4-E5: 30% faster 
than medium 
E5-E6:Ankara goes to 
40% by 2050; other’s 
follow by closing the 
gap by 75% 
 
 
 
Medium 
Regions with low 
fertility (TFR < 
1.75): TFR 
declines to1.4 and 
then increases 
and converges 
to1.85;  
Regions with 
high fertility: 
TFR will decline 
and converge to 
1.75 and then 
increases and 
converge to 2.0. 
e0 for Ankara 
follows Turkey's 
path as in the 
UN’s medium 
projection till 
2050; the 
remaining four 
provinces will take 
a path such that by 
2050the current 
difference in e0 
with Ankara 
diminishes by 1/3rd 
The rate of age 
and sex specific 
net-migration 
will remain 
constant and 
distributed 
proportionally 
by education 
Apply WIC's 
net migration 
rate by age and 
sex for Turkey. 
Education Attainment 
Progression Ratio 
(EAPR): 
E1-E2: 99%(by 2020) 
E2-E3: 99%(by 2020) 
E3-E4: Trend 
Extrapolation to98% 
E4-E5: Trend: 80% 
ceiling 
E5-E6:converges to 
50% of the gap with 
Ankara by 2050 
 
 
 
3-Child 
Regions with low 
fertility (TFR < 
1.75): TFR 
slowly reaches 
1.5and then 
slowly converges 
to 2.0;  
 
Regions with 
high fertility: 
TFR converges to 
2.5 
Increase in e0 in 
Ankara will be 1 
year per decade 
less than in the 
Medium scenario; 
the  remaining 
four provinces will 
follow Ankara’s 
path maintaining 
the difference 
Net migration 
rate doubles 
(compared to 
the Medium 
scenario) 
Half the rate of 
age-sex specific 
net-migration 
than in the 
Medium 
scenario until 
2020 – 
remaining 
constant 
thereafter 
E1-E2: 99%(by 2020) 
E2-E3: 99%(by 2030) 
E3-E4: 30% slower 
than medium 
E4-E5: 30% slower 
than medium 
E5-E6: No 
convergence 
(constant) 
Table 1. Fertility, mortality, internal and international migration, and education 
assumptions for selected provinces by the scenarios. 
2.4. Assumptions 
As a second step, Table 1 shows how we operationalize the demographic and education 
scenario in terms TFRs, life expectancies at birth, migration rates, and education 
transition. Fertility and mortality are the fundamental components that change the 
population; the former creates individuals while the latter eliminates individuals. 
Migration is relative, in geographic terms the smaller the geographic units are, the 
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higher the migration rates tend to be because the movements of more people are 
captured. 
2.4.1. Fertility Assumptions 
In Turkey, diversity between provinces is huge, as pointed out earlier among the 
selected provinces. For example, the current fertility rate in Ankara is around 1.67, 
whereas it is twice that in Van, 3.52 (TSI, 2013b). Given past information, the task here 
is to come up with future trajectories of fertility in each province under given story lines 
and in this paper additional emphasis is placed on the pace of convergence between 
provinces. Future evolution depends mainly on how fertility behaviour among 
individuals in the provinces will change in the future. 
 
NUTS-1 Region TFR 
Median age at first 
marriage (women 
aged 25-49) 
Mean ideal number of 
children 
(ever-married women 
aged 15-49) 
Contraceptive use 
 (any method) 
(married women aged 15-
49) 
Istanbul 1.78 21.4 2.4 74.3 
West Marmara 1.38 20.9 2.1 76.2 
Aegean 1.91 20.6 2.4 80.0 
East Marmara 1.80 21.5 2.3 76.8 
West Anatolia 2.40 21.0 2.3 75.7 
Mediterranean 2.09 21.1 2.8 70.4 
Central Anatolia 2.09 19.4 2.4 72.2 
West Black Sea 1.90 20.5 2.3 77.5 
East Black Sea 2.10 21.3 2.7 68.2 
Northeast Anatolia 2.59 19.8 2.6 70.4 
Central East Anatolia 3.33 19.6 3.1 62.3 
Southeast Anatolia 3.47 19.5 3.3 57.8 
Turkey 2.16 20.8 2.5 73.0 
Source: HUIPS (2009). 
Table 2. Region -specific (NUTS-1) TFR, median age at first marriage, mean ideal 
number of children and the contraceptive use in Turkey, 2008. 
We take a step back and try to list what determines the fertility rate in a 
region/country. In a traditional society, three factors play important roles: age at 
marriage, mean ideal number of children, and contraceptive use. According to the 
Turkish Demographic and Health Survey 2008 (HUIPS, 2009), in the West Anatolia 
region (NUTS1) in which the province of Ankara located (Table 2), the average age at 
marriage is 21.0 while it is 19.6 in the Central East Anatolia region where Van is 
situated. This difference is not very significant. 
The mean ideal number of children is also low in the West Anatolia region 
(Ankara) (2.3), compared to the Central East Anatolia region (3.1) (Van). And finally, 
contraceptive usage (any method) and TFR are currently 75.7 and 2.40 in West 
Anatolia, compared to 62.3 and 3.33 respectively in Central East Anatolia. These 
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figures offer some explanations for why fertility is low in Ankara and high in Van. We 
consider this information along with the past development in other countries where the 
fertility transition has already occurred. Furthermore, some subjective choices were 
made whenever it was not possible to use any available information, all of which are 
clearly stated in the following scenario descriptions. 
Euro: This is a scenario where Turkey’s integration with EU is likely to affect the 
fertility behaviour of the Turkish population. In general, we expect fertility to decline 
very rapidly due to several reasons. Firstly, EU integration will lead to a flow of Turkish 
migrants to other European countries (therefore, high rate of migration) mainly for the 
labour reasons. More women will join the labour force within the country and education 
will spread in low level regions resulting in greater educational attainment of the whole 
country. All these factors will push overall fertility downwards. Therefore, we assume 
that fertility rates will further decline in all provinces; provinces with TFR of less than 
2.1 will reach the minimum value of 1.3 (similar to many European experiences) and 
will then slowly increase to 1.75. For other regions, fertility will gradually decline to 
1.75; for example, Izmir with a current level of 1.5 will reach 1.3 in 2020-25 and then 
will slowly increase to a level of 1.75 by 2050-55. Ankara and Kayseri will follow the 
path of Izmir whereas the two provinces with higher levels of fertility, namely Van and 
Gaziantep, will slowly converge to 1.75 by 2050 (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6. Assumed TFRs for Euro, Medium and 3-Child scenarios for the five 
provinces. 
Medium: Under this scenario, which is a bit less optimistic than the Euro scenario, the 
decline in fertility will be slower than in the Euro scenario. Low fertility regions will 
reach the minimum value of 1.4 and will slowly increase to 1.85, 0.1 higher than in the 
Euro scenario. For other regions with higher levels of fertility, fertility will decline to a 
level of 1.75 before starting to increase and levelling off at a value of 2.0 (Figure 6). 
3-Child: This scenario is a result of Turkey becoming more traditional due to the rise of 
political and religious conservatism. On the one hand Turkey is in Europe with an 
ambition to be in the EU, and on the other hand Turkey borders many unstable Arab and 
middle-Asian countries. We expect that fertility level in the regions with higher fertility 
will converge to a level of 2.5 (TFR) as a result of the government’s push towards the 
target of 3. In low fertility regions, we assume that the fertility will slightly decline to a 
level of 1.5 and then increase to a level of 2.0 (Figure 6).  
2.4.2. Mortality Assumptions 
Euro: Under the Euro scenario, we assume that an improvement in life expectancy will 
be faster than projected by the UN by one year per decade. Ankara being a front runner, 
this pace is applied first to Ankara. For rest of the provinces, we expect mortality 
inequality between provinces to diminish by 2/3rdby 2050 (Table 1). 
Medium: In this scenario, we expect that a steady pace of improvement in the overall 
health condition will continue, resulting in higher levels of life expectancies. We 
assume that such a pace will be similar to what UN assumes for Turkey in its Medium 
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variant. We assume that Ankara follows the UN path for Turkey and the rest of the 
provinces follow Ankara, diminishing the gap by 1/3rd by 2050. 
3-Child: In this scenario, we expect the overall rate of increase to be slower than in the 
Medium scenario by 1 year per decade. The difference in life expectancy will remain 
the same till the end of the period.  
Migration Assumptions 
Euro: In terms of internal migration, we expect a decline as the rate of international 
migration will increase, leaving enough jobs available locally which will stop many 
from going to larger urban centres. We assume that by 2020-25 internal migration will 
decline by 50% of the observed rates covering the period of 2007-2011 and will remain 
constant (Table 1). 
Medium: We assume that the rate of migration does not change and remains constant by 
age and sex until the end of the period, a business as usual scenario. 
3-Child: Contrary to the Euro scenario, not being in the EU will give rise to a situation 
where development occurs at different levels/paces in different parts of the country. The 
imbalance within the country and restrictions imposed by other European countries 
through stringent visa rules will force people from less developed regions to migrate to 
developed regions. We assume that by 2020-25 internal migration will increase by 50% 
of the observed rate in the period of 2007-2011 and thereafter will remain constant. 
2.4.3 Education Assumptions 
The transition from a lower level to a higher level of education can be measured in 
several ways. We define the transition in terms of EAPR, which is a proportion of the 
population who progressed to the next level from below. The EAPR can be calculated 
from a population distributed by education. For example, if 40% of a population in a 
certain cohort have completed at least upper secondary and 80% have completed at least 
lower secondary then the EAPR to upper secondary is 0.5 (40%/80%). In this study we 
define six level of educational attainment and hence need five EAPRs. 
Education Categories 
The Turkish educational system is basically made up of two sections: formal and non-
formal education. Formal education can be defined as the regular education of 
individuals of a certain age group as provided in schools. The formal educational 
institution consists of four levels: pre-school education, primary education (lasting 8 
years total), secondary (high school) education (adding to 11 years total, including the 
previous levels), and higher (post-secondary / tertiary or university) education – for a 
grand total of 13 or more years. Formal education is free in public schools, and 
compulsory education in Turkey was expanded from 5 years to 8starting with the 1997-
1998 educational year3. As for Turkey’s non-formal education, it aims to assist formal 
                                                 
3Starting with the 2012-2013 educational year, compulsory education was expanded from 8 years to 12. 
This new educational system consists of 3 stages: 4 year for primary school education+ 4 year for junior 
high school education+ 4 year for high school education. 
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institutions and offer life-long learning opportunities for children as well as adults 
(Duman, 2010; Gökçe, 2004)4. 
Code Category Definition in Turkish Education System Explanation 
E1 No education No education No formal education or illiterate 
E2 Incomplete primary No education but literate 
Uncompleted primary and completed reading and 
writing course 
E3 Completed primary 
Primary school education (the 
first level of primary education 
for 5 years) 
Completed the first level of primary education, 
uncompleted the second level of primary education 
E4 
Completed 
lower secondary 
Junior high school education 
(the second level of primary 
education for 3 years) 
Completed lower secondary and uncompleted higher 
secondary, completed junior high school and 
vocational school at junior high school level 
 Primary education Completed primary education for 8 years,  
uncompleted higher secondary 
E5 Completed 
upper secondary Secondary education 
Completed high school education, uncompleted 
tertiary education 
E6 Tertiary Tertiary education Completed tertiary education for 2 years and more 
Table 3. Education categories. 
In our study, population was grouped into six educational categories, namely, no 
education, incomplete primary, completed primary, completed lower secondary, 
completed upper secondary and tertiary (Table 3)5.  
Euro: In the Euro scenario, education will be a priority and the government is likely to 
make policies to decrease inequality in the country. This will, sooner or later, result in at 
least universal attainment of basic education in all regions of Turkey. We are painting a 
very optimistic future in terms of education in Turkey and therefore we define the 
education scenario in “Euro” world as all children aged 10-14 attaining school by 2015. 
The advancement in the transitions from completed primary (E3) to completed lower 
secondary (E4) and E4 to completed upper secondary (E5) are assumed to be 30% faster 
than in the Medium scenario. Similarly, the transition rate from E5 to tertiary education 
(E6) for Ankara will further increase from its current stalled level of 40% to 50% and 
the rest of the provinces will follow Ankara by closing the gap by 75% (Table 1). 
Medium: We assume a moderately optimistic education progression. Universal primary 
attainment will be achieved by 2020. The transition ratio from completed primary (E3) 
to lower secondary (E4) will continue to increase levelling at 98%. Similar continuation 
of the past improvement is assumed for the transition ratios between E4 and upper 
secondary (E5) levelling off at 80%. Finally, the progression to E6 is assumed to be 
constant at the level of Ankara (stalled). The remainder of the regions are assumed to 
close the gap with Ankara by 50% by 2050 (Table 1). 
                                                 
4Notably, many reading and writing courses for girls and women have been used by the government and 
non-governmental organisations alike to help narrow the gender literacy gap in undeveloped eastern 
regions via the non-formal education system. 
5Due to recent change in education policy, primary education (compulsory primary education for 8 year) 
is not applicable for young population. 
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3-Child: In the “3-Child” scenario, we expect progress in educational attainment but 
with a slower overall speed and significantly slower in regions such as Van and 
Gaziantep. Under this scenario, the transition from E2 to E3 is slower than in the Euro 
and Medium scenarios, it will take an additional 10 years to have universal primary 
completion. Along the same lines, the transition from E3 to E4 and E4 to E5 will be 
30% slower than in the Medium scenario. Finally, the transition from E5 to E6 will 
remain constant (Table 1).  
3. Results 
We defined three storylines for the future of Turkey. Based on our knowledge about the 
past and expectation in the future for each scenario, we posited set of assumptions for 
fertility, mortality, migration, and education. We used these sets of assumptions along 
with population distribution in the year 2010 and projected the population for the five 
selected provinces using the multi-state population projection method for the period 
2010-2050. Table 4 shows the population distribution by broad age-groups for the five 
provinces under the three scenarios. 
Under all scenarios, population in the five provinces will grow between 2010 
and 2050. Overall, population growth will be the highest in the 3-Child scenario and the 
least in the Euro scenario. Under the Euro scenario, there are significant differences in 
population increases between provinces during the 40 years. At one extreme is the 
province Van -the least developed province- with 84% growth and in the other extreme 
is Izmir -a highly developed (rich, educated, etc.) province- with a very low level of 
growth of 17%. The growth rate is less heterogeneous under the 3-Child scenario and is 
different than in the Euro scenario, as provinces of Ankara (71%) and Kayseri (77%) 
will see faster growth and Van (50%) will see slower growth. Gaziantep will experience 
high growth in all scenarios (by 67% in Euro and Medium and 85% in 3-Child). In 
terms of population growth, the Medium scenario is closer to the Euro scenario than the 
3-Child scenario (Table 4). 
The results of the projection show clear differences in terms of population 
distribution by broad age groups under the three scenarios. The size of the 0-14 age-
group will decline in all provinces during the period of 2010-2050 under the Euro and 
the Medium scenario (although lower in the former) as a result of an overall decline in 
the level of assumed fertility. Under the 3-Child scenario–due to a high level of internal 
migration- all provinces except Van will experience explicit growth of the population 
size of 0-14 years old. 
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Province Age Group 
 Scenario 
Euro  Medium  3-Child 
2010 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050 
Ankara 
0-14 1.06 0.78 0.81 1.06 0.93 1.04 1.06 1.17 1.55 
15-64 3.38 3.89 3.47 3.38 4.07 4.02 3.38 4.43 5.19 
65+ 0.32 0.93 1.76 0.32 0.88 1.60 0.32 0.83 1.43 
Total 4.77 5.61 6.04 4.77 5.88 6.66 4.77 6.43 8.17 
Gaziantep 
0-14 0.60 0.59 0.50 0.60 0.60 0.52 0.60 0.64 0.75 
15-64 1.03 1.57 1.85 1.03 1.58 1.89 1.03 1.59 2.01 
65+ 0.08 0.20 0.48 0.08 0.19 0.44 0.08 0.18 0.39 
Total 1.70 2.36 2.84 1.70 2.37 2.85 1.70 2.42 3.15 
Izmir 
0-14 0.78 0.61 0.60 0.78 0.73 0.75 0.78 0.83 1.01 
15-64 2.83 2.99 2.58 2.83 3.08 2.91 2.83 3.28 3.45 
65+ 0.34 0.83 1.43 0.34 0.80 1.30 0.34 0.78 1.21 
Total 3.95 4.43 4.61 3.95 4.61 4.96 3.95 4.89 5.67 
Kayseri 
0-14 0.33 0.28 0.25 0.33 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.41 0.51 
15-64 0.82 1.02 1.02 0.82 1.04 1.08 0.82 1.10 1.33 
65+ 0.08 0.21 0.41 0.08 0.20 0.37 0.08 0.19 0.35 
Total 1.24 1.51 1.68 1.24 1.53 1.76 1.24 1.71 2.19 
Van 
0-14 0.42 0.46 0.40 0.42 0.45 0.39 0.42 0.43 0.38 
15-64 0.58 0.97 1.28 0.58 0.93 1.19 0.58 0.86 1.00 
65+ 0.03 0.09 0.23 0.03 0.08 0.20 0.03 0.08 0.16 
Total 1.04 1.52 1.91 1.04 1.47 1.78 1.04 1.37 1.55 
Table 4. Population (in millions) by broad-age-groups for Euro, Medium, and 3-Child 
scenarios, 2010, 2030, and 2050. 
Regarding the size of working age population15-64years old, salient differences 
can be seen among the provinces in terms of changes during the projection period. By 
2030, the size of the labour-force will increase under all scenarios, mainly due to the 
larger younger cohorts replacing the smaller older cohorts. The growth is largest in 
Gaziantep and Van. By 2050, under 3-Child scenario, the population aged 15-64 will 
further increase. However, under the Euro scenario, the size of the 15-64 years old in 
Izmir and Ankara will decline compared to 2030. Same is true under Medium scenario, 
however to a lesser extent. 
The projection of population aged 65 and over is important with respect to the 
different pace of aging in the provinces under the three scenarios. While the aging 
pattern preserves its structure among the provinces from 2010 to 2050, the size of this 
age group differs between the scenarios. In all provinces and under all scenarios, by 
2030, the size of the elderly population increases by more than 2 to 3 folds. By 
definition, the Euro scenario results in the highest rate of ageing in terms of an 
increasing proportion of elderly. Izmir will have more than 30% of the population aged 
over 65 followed by Ankara (29%) and Kayseri (24%). Ageing is least pronounced 
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under 3-Child scenario. For Van, the proportion aged 65+ seems to be the same in all 
three scenarios, which is a result of a fine balance mainly between forces of migration 
and fertility. 
Table 5 shows the number of births and deaths as well as internal and 
international migration corresponding to the assumed demographic trajectories under 
different scenarios. This table is useful in decomposing the change in the overall 
population. Births and positive net migration add up to the existing population whereas 
deaths and negative net migration takes people away from the province. 
There are significantly more births than deaths in all provinces, which is the 
primary reason for the increase in the population in all scenarios. At the beginning 
2010-2015 under Euro scenario, the births to deaths ratio is as high as 13.3 in Van and 
as low as 3.9 in Izmir. This ratio diminishes in the future in all provinces under all 
scenarios except in Van under the Euro and Medium scenario where it increases for one 
more quinquennium. The ratio starts diminishing faster in the Euro scenario than in the 
3-Child scenario mainly due to the lower fertility assumptions of the Euro scenario. 
Overall, the importance of international migration is small. However, internal migration 
is as important a component as death, especially in the Medium and 3-Child scenario. In 
the provinces of Ankara and Izmir, the number of deaths can simply be compensated by 
a fraction of migrants coming into the province; whereas, in Van, the population 
diminishes by deaths and much more by those leaving the province. In Gaziantep and 
Izmir, the deaths are not fully replaced by the migrants. 
Under the Euro scenario, the number of births will decline in all provinces 
except Van, while in the other two scenarios the number of births will mostly increase. 
The increase is much faster in provinces where a high number of people are migrating 
in; for example, in Ankara births will be as high as 1 million in the period 2045-2050. 
As expected, in all provinces and under every scenario, the number of deaths increases 
due to the increase in the share of the 65 and over age group. In Izmir and Ankara under 
the Euro scenario, the rate of change in the number of births and deaths as well as 
internal and international migration is similar. The provinces of Kayseri and Gaziantep 
have a declining trend in the number of births and a slight rise in the number of deaths. 
Under the Medium scenario, the numbers of births, deaths, internal and international 
migration have a similar pace in all provinces. More specifically, while the provinces of 
Ankara and Izmir will have a higher number of births and deaths, the other provinces 
have a higher internal migration numbers, compared to Euro scenario. However, 
Gaziantep, Kayseri and Van have lower international migration numbers. Under the 3-
Child scenario, the number of births, deaths, internal and international migration differs 
markedly in all provinces compared to the other two scenarios. It can be seen that while 
the numbers of births, deaths and internal migration increase in Ankara and Izmir, the 
number of international migration decreases, comparing particularly the trends in the 
Euro scenario for the whole period. 
Next, we compare the evolution of education in the population under Euro, 
Medium, and 3-Child scenarios. Figure 7 shows the population pyramid by age, sex, 
and level of education in the provinces for the starting year 2010 and the projected 
structure for the year 2050 for each scenario. As expected, with improvements in 
education, the overall level of education in the population rises, which partly accelerates 
the fertility decline in all scenarios except for the 3-child scenario (Table 6, 7, and 8), 
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where we expect the government policy to work to some extent resulting in some level 
of stagnation in the future.  
As shown in the figures 7 and 8, Ankara has a universal junior secondary 
education; almost all children in the school going age have completed junior secondary 
and a majority has completed upper secondary with more than a quarter in respective 
age groups having completed tertiary: this is similar to what we observe in developed 
countries and societies. On the other hand, in Van there is a large gap in terms of 
educating the population and this province resembles countries in South Asia or other 
developing countries. Under the Euro scenario, we expect that the education policies 
will be aggressive to fill the inequality between the provinces. Under the 3-child 
scenario, progress will be done but at slower pace and much slower in provinces such as 
Van and Gaziantep. 
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Province Period 
 Births 
 
Deaths 
 
Internal net migration 
 
International net migration 
Scenario 
Euro Medium 3-Child 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Euro Medium 3-Child 
  
  
  
  
  
Euro Medium 3-Child 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Euro Medium 3-Child 
Ankara 
  
2010-2015 600 608 624 105 109 114 153.9 205.2 307.8 -11.2 -7.4 -5.6 
2020-2025 502 603 731 128 143 158 92.4 192.2 414.8 -14.0 -7.2 -3.7 
2030-2035 548 668 864 159 186 213 80.7 181.3 435.2 -12.4 -6.6 -3.7 
2040-2045 534 672 965 202 242 284 71.4 174.6 470.6 -10.1 -5.5 -3.2 
2045-2050 505 665 1018 226 272 322 68.8 174.5 497.2 -8.5 -4.8 -3.0 
Gaziantep 
  
2010-2015 402 404 406 40 42 44 9.0 12.0 18.0 -3.5 -2.3 -1.7 
2020-2025 398 407 427 41 46 52 6.7 13.5 27.1 -4.9 -2.5 -1.2 
2030-2035 361 378 480 46 55 66 7.8 15.8 32.7 -5.2 -2.6 -1.3 
2040-2045 337 341 503 54 69 87 7.9 16.1 35.6 -4.9 -2.5 -1.3 
2045-2050 334 360 518 60 78 101 8.0 16.3 36.5 -4.6 -2.3 -1.2 
Izmir 
  
2010-2015 440 451 487 112 117 122 90.0 120.0 180.0 -9.1 -6.0 -4.5 
2020-2025 408 479 537 131 146 161 56.3 116.2 242.7 -11.2 -5.7 -2.9 
2030-2035 421 500 592 155 181 210 51.6 111.9 248.4 -9.4 -4.9 -2.6 
2040-2045 395 489 651 185 223 266 49.0 112.2 264.3 -7.3 -3.9 -2.2 
2045-2050 380 491 674 201 243 293 47.9 112.1 273.5 -6.2 -3.5 -2.1 
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Province Period 
 Births 
 
Deaths 
 
Internal net migration 
 
International net migration 
Scenario 
Euro Medium 3-Child 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Euro Medium 3-Child 
  
  
  
  
  
Euro Medium 3-Child 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Euro Medium 3-Child 
Kayseri 
  
2010-2015 199 201 259 36 37 39 16.3 21.7 32.6 -2.7 -1.8 -1.3 
2020-2025 186 199 273 38 43 48 11.3 22.8 50.4 -3.5 -1.8 -0.9 
2030-2035 183 214 297 43 50 60 11.9 24.5 55.5 -3.3 -1.7 -0.8 
2040-2045 167 200 336 49 61 76 12.3 26.0 62.8 -2.8 -1.4 -0.8 
2045-2050 163 202 352 54 67 85 12.0 25.6 66.6 -2.5 -1.3 -0.8 
Van 
  
2010-2015 289 290 289 22 23 24 -31.3 -41.7 -62.5 -1.9 -1.3 -0.9 
2020-2025 323 322 312 21 25 28 -25.1 -49.3 -95.3 -3.1 -1.5 -0.7 
2030-2035 307 304 286 23 29 34 -28.6 -55.4 -102.5 -3.4 -1.6 -0.7 
2040-2045 275 273 276 28 36 44 -29.7 -56.7 -101.1 -3.1 -1.5 -0.6 
2045-2050 252 252 276 31 40 50 -29.9 -56.7 -100.4 -3.0 -1.4 -0.6 
Table 5. Births, deaths, and migration numbers for Euro, Medium, and 3-Child scenarios, by selected provinces in five year-intervals, 
2010-2050. 
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Figure 7. Distribution of population by age, sex, and level of educational attainment in the five selected/representative provinces in 2050 
under the Euro (Eur), Medium (Med), and 3-Child (3Ch) scenarios. 
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Our purpose here is to show the outcome of the current structure of age-sex-
education projected according to the future assumptions of each scenario. Since Ankara 
is already in an advance state of education, the difference in terms of education is not 
much. The population will be larger, the demand will be much higher and the 
government needs to respond to this demand by investing in new schools/universities. 
Whereas in Euro scenario, there will be less demand for education in terms of total size 
and this will lessen the pressure on basic educational institutions (providing an 
opportunity to improve quality over quantity) and people will increasingly continue to 
higher education. Hence more university seats need to be created. On the other hand, in 
the province of Van under the Euro scenario, population will benefit from aggressive 
education policies and will be much more educated. However, in the 3-Child scenario, 
the education structure will lag behind that of the Euro scenario. Mainly due to the high 
number of births, the government will have difficulty in meeting the demand for 
education (Figure 8). 
 
 
Figure 8. Population sizes in provinces of Ankara and Van by level of educational 
attainment projected to 2050 on the basis of three different scenarios. 
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Scenario  
Year 
 Males 
 
Females 
Euro 
  
Population distribution aged 15+ 
Proportion with at least 
 upper secondary,  
aged 20-39  
Population distribution aged 15+ 
Proportion with at least 
 upper secondary,  
aged 20-39 
Province 
  Education category 
 
Education category 
  E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 Upper Secondary+ 
 
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 Upper Secondary+ 
Ankara 
 2010  0.01 0.02 0.19 0.25 0.32 0.20 0.65 
 
0.10 0.04 0.28 0.18 0.25 0.15 0.56 
 2020  0.01 0.02 0.16 0.23 0.36 0.23 0.73 
 
0.07 0.03 0.24 0.17 0.29 0.20 0.71 
 2030  0.00 0.01 0.12 0.23 0.38 0.26 0.77 
 
0.05 0.02 0.20 0.17 0.32 0.23 0.79 
 2040  0.00 0.01 0.09 0.22 0.39 0.28 0.78 
 
0.04 0.02 0.16 0.17 0.34 0.27 0.81 
 2050  0.00 0.01 0.07 0.22 0.40 0.30 0.78 
 
0.03 0.01 0.12 0.18 0.36 0.29 0.81 
Gaziantep 
 2010  0.03 0.07 0.26 0.36 0.20 0.08 0.38 
 
0.20 0.11 0.32 0.21 0.12 0.04 0.24 
 2020  0.02 0.06 0.22 0.33 0.27 0.11 0.52 
 
0.13 0.10 0.26 0.21 0.21 0.09 0.46 
 2030  0.01 0.04 0.15 0.33 0.31 0.16 0.64 
 
0.09 0.07 0.20 0.22 0.27 0.15 0.67 
 2040  0.00 0.03 0.11 0.32 0.34 0.20 0.71 
 
0.06 0.06 0.16 0.23 0.31 0.20 0.76 
 2050  0.00 0.03 0.08 0.30 0.36 0.23 0.74 
 
0.04 0.05 0.12 0.23 0.33 0.24 0.78 
Izmir 
 2010  0.02 0.03 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.14 0.53 
 
0.11 0.05 0.33 0.18 0.21 0.12 0.47 
 2020  0.01 0.03 0.23 0.24 0.31 0.18 0.67 
 
0.08 0.04 0.29 0.17 0.26 0.16 0.66 
 2030  0.01 0.02 0.18 0.24 0.34 0.21 0.75 
 
0.06 0.03 0.24 0.17 0.29 0.20 0.78 
 2040  0.01 0.02 0.13 0.24 0.36 0.24 0.78 
 
0.04 0.03 0.20 0.18 0.32 0.23 0.81 
 2050  0.00 0.02 0.10 0.24 0.38 0.27 0.78 
 
0.03 0.02 0.15 0.19 0.34 0.26 0.81 
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Scenario  
Year 
 Males 
 
Females 
Euro 
  
Population distribution aged 15+ 
Proportion with at least 
 upper secondary,  
aged 20-39  
Population distribution aged 15+ 
Proportion with at least 
 upper secondary,  
aged 20-39 
Province 
  Education category 
 
Education category 
  E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 Upper Secondary+ 
 
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 Upper Secondary+ 
Kayseri 
 2010  0.02 0.03 0.26 0.29 0.27 0.12 0.55 
 
0.16 0.06 0.36 0.19 0.18 0.07 0.41 
 2020  0.01 0.02 0.21 0.26 0.32 0.16 0.68 
 
0.11 0.04 0.30 0.17 0.25 0.12 0.64 
 2030  0.01 0.02 0.16 0.26 0.36 0.20 0.75 
 
0.07 0.03 0.24 0.18 0.29 0.18 0.78 
 2040  0.00 0.01 0.11 0.25 0.38 0.24 0.78 
 
0.05 0.02 0.20 0.19 0.32 0.22 0.81 
 2050  0.00 0.01 0.08 0.25 0.39 0.27 0.78 
 
0.03 0.02 0.15 0.19 0.35 0.26 0.81 
Van 
 2010  0.07 0.15 0.24 0.31 0.18 0.06 0.34 
 
0.31 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.08 0.02 0.15 
 2020  0.04 0.12 0.20 0.26 0.28 0.10 0.52 
 
0.21 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.07 0.33 
 2030  0.02 0.09 0.14 0.26 0.33 0.16 0.66 
 
0.15 0.14 0.12 0.23 0.24 0.13 0.57 
 2040  0.01 0.06 0.11 0.26 0.35 0.20 0.75 
 
0.11 0.11 0.09 0.24 0.28 0.18 0.73 
 2050  0.01 0.05 0.08 0.25 0.37 0.24 0.77 
 
0.08 0.08 0.07 0.24 0.31 0.22 0.75 
Note: Education categories: E1: No Education; E2: Incomplete Primary; E3: Completed primary; E4: Completed lower secondary; E5: Completed upper Secondary; E6: Tertiary 
Table 6. Education distribution by sex among population aged 15 and above and for 20-39 years old under Euro scenario. 
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Scenario  
Year 
 Males 
 
Females 
Medium 
  
Population distribution aged 15+ 
Proportion with at least 
 upper secondary,  
aged 20-39  
Population distribution aged 15+ 
Proportion with at least 
 upper secondary,  
aged 20-39 
Province 
  Education category 
 
Education category 
  E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 Upper Secondary+ 
 
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 Upper Secondary+ 
Ankara 
 2010  0.01 0.02 0.19 0.25 0.32 0.20 0.65 
 
0.10 0.04 0.28 0.18 0.25 0.15 0.56 
 2020  0.00 0.02 0.16 0.23 0.36 0.22 0.73 
 
0.07 0.03 0.24 0.17 0.30 0.19 0.71 
 2030  0.00 0.01 0.12 0.23 0.40 0.24 0.77 
 
0.05 0.03 0.19 0.17 0.34 0.22 0.78 
 2040  0.00 0.01 0.08 0.23 0.42 0.26 0.78 
 
0.03 0.02 0.15 0.18 0.37 0.25 0.80 
 2050  0.00 0.01 0.06 0.22 0.44 0.27 0.78 
 
0.02 0.01 0.11 0.19 0.40 0.27 0.81 
Gaziantep 
 2010  0.03 0.07 0.26 0.36 0.20 0.08 0.38 
 
0.20 0.11 0.32 0.21 0.12 0.04 0.24 
 2020  0.02 0.06 0.22 0.33 0.27 0.10 0.51 
 
0.13 0.11 0.27 0.20 0.20 0.08 0.44 
 2030  0.01 0.04 0.15 0.34 0.33 0.13 0.62 
 
0.08 0.09 0.20 0.23 0.27 0.12 0.61 
 2040  0.00 0.03 0.11 0.33 0.36 0.16 0.69 
 
0.05 0.07 0.15 0.24 0.32 0.16 0.72 
 2050  0.00 0.02 0.07 0.32 0.39 0.19 0.72 
 
0.03 0.06 0.12 0.24 0.36 0.20 0.77 
Izmir 
 2010  0.02 0.03 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.14 0.53 
 
0.11 0.05 0.33 0.18 0.21 0.12 0.47 
 2020  0.01 0.03 0.23 0.24 0.32 0.17 0.67 
 
0.08 0.04 0.29 0.17 0.27 0.15 0.65 
 2030  0.01 0.02 0.17 0.24 0.36 0.20 0.74 
 
0.06 0.04 0.24 0.18 0.31 0.19 0.76 
 2040  0.00 0.02 0.13 0.25 0.39 0.21 0.77 
 
0.04 0.03 0.19 0.19 0.34 0.22 0.80 
 2050  0.00 0.01 0.08 0.24 0.42 0.23 0.78 
 
0.03 0.02 0.14 0.19 0.38 0.25 0.81 
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Scenario  
Year 
 Males 
 
Females 
Medium 
  
Population distribution aged 15+ 
Proportion with at least 
 upper secondary,  
aged 20-39  
Population distribution aged 15+ 
Proportion with at least 
 upper secondary,  
aged 20-39 
Province 
  Education category 
 
Education category 
  E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 Upper Secondary+ 
 
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 Upper Secondary+ 
Kayseri 
 2010  0.02 0.03 0.26 0.29 0.27 0.12 0.55 
 
0.16 0.06 0.36 0.19 0.18 0.07 0.41 
 2020  0.01 0.02 0.22 0.27 0.33 0.15 0.68 
 
0.11 0.05 0.30 0.17 0.26 0.11 0.63 
 2030  0.01 0.02 0.15 0.26 0.38 0.18 0.75 
 
0.07 0.04 0.24 0.18 0.31 0.16 0.76 
 2040  0.00 0.01 0.11 0.26 0.41 0.21 0.78 
 
0.05 0.03 0.19 0.19 0.35 0.20 0.80 
 2050  0.00 0.01 0.07 0.25 0.44 0.23 0.78 
 
0.03 0.02 0.14 0.20 0.39 0.23 0.81 
Van 
 2010  0.07 0.15 0.24 0.31 0.18 0.06 0.34 
 
0.31 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.08 0.02 0.15 
 2020  0.04 0.12 0.20 0.27 0.29 0.09 0.51 
 
0.21 0.23 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.06 0.30 
 2030  0.02 0.09 0.14 0.27 0.34 0.14 0.65 
 
0.15 0.19 0.12 0.22 0.22 0.10 0.47 
 2040  0.01 0.06 0.11 0.27 0.38 0.17 0.74 
 
0.10 0.15 0.09 0.24 0.28 0.14 0.65 
 2050  0.01 0.05 0.07 0.26 0.41 0.19 0.76 
 
0.07 0.12 0.07 0.25 0.32 0.18 0.73 
Note: Education categories: E1: No Education; E2: Incomplete Primary; E3: Completed primary; E4: Completed lower secondary; E5: Completed upper Secondary; E6: Tertiary 
Table 7. Education distribution by sex among population aged 15 and above and for 20-39 years old under Medium scenario. 
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Scenario  
Year 
 Males 
 
Females 
3-Child 
  
Population distribution aged 15+ 
Proportion with at least 
 upper secondary,  
aged 20-39  
Population distribution aged 15+ 
Proportion with at least 
 upper secondary,  
aged 20-39 
Province 
  Education category 
 
Education category 
  E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 Upper Secondary+ 
 
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 Upper Secondary+ 
Ankara 
 2010  0.01 0.02 0.19 0.25 0.32 0.20 0.65 
 
0.10 0.04 0.28 0.18 0.25 0.15 0.56 
 2020  0.00 0.02 0.16 0.23 0.37 0.22 0.73 
 
0.07 0.03 0.23 0.17 0.30 0.19 0.70 
 2030  0.00 0.02 0.11 0.23 0.40 0.24 0.75 
 
0.05 0.03 0.18 0.18 0.35 0.22 0.78 
 2040  0.00 0.02 0.07 0.23 0.43 0.25 0.77 
 
0.03 0.02 0.13 0.19 0.39 0.25 0.80 
 2050  0.00 0.01 0.05 0.23 0.45 0.26 0.78 
 
0.02 0.02 0.09 0.19 0.42 0.27 0.81 
Gaziantep 
 2010  0.03 0.07 0.26 0.36 0.20 0.08 0.38 
 
0.20 0.11 0.32 0.21 0.12 0.04 0.24 
 2020  0.02 0.07 0.23 0.33 0.26 0.10 0.49 
 
0.13 0.12 0.27 0.20 0.20 0.07 0.42 
 2030  0.01 0.06 0.16 0.34 0.31 0.12 0.57 
 
0.08 0.11 0.21 0.23 0.26 0.11 0.56 
 2040  0.00 0.05 0.11 0.34 0.35 0.15 0.64 
 
0.05 0.09 0.16 0.25 0.31 0.14 0.65 
 2050  0.00 0.04 0.07 0.34 0.39 0.17 0.69 
 
0.03 0.08 0.11 0.26 0.36 0.17 0.72 
Izmir 
 2010  0.02 0.03 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.14 0.53 
 
0.11 0.05 0.33 0.18 0.21 0.12 0.47 
 2020  0.01 0.03 0.23 0.24 0.32 0.17 0.66 
 
0.08 0.05 0.29 0.17 0.27 0.15 0.65 
 2030  0.01 0.03 0.17 0.25 0.36 0.19 0.72 
 
0.05 0.04 0.23 0.18 0.31 0.18 0.75 
 2040  0.00 0.02 0.12 0.25 0.40 0.21 0.75 
 
0.03 0.03 0.17 0.19 0.36 0.21 0.78 
 2050  0.00 0.02 0.07 0.25 0.43 0.22 0.77 
 
0.02 0.03 0.12 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.80 
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Scenario  
Year 
 Males 
 
Females 
3-Child 
  
Population distribution aged 15+ 
Proportion with at least 
 upper secondary,  
aged 20-39  
Population distribution aged 15+ 
Proportion with at least 
 upper secondary,  
aged 20-39 
Province 
  Education category 
 
Education category 
  E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 Upper Secondary+ 
 
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 Upper Secondary+ 
Kayseri 
 2010  0.02 0.03 0.26 0.29 0.27 0.12 0.55 
 
0.16 0.06 0.36 0.19 0.18 0.07 0.41 
 2020  0.01 0.03 0.22 0.27 0.33 0.15 0.67 
 
0.11 0.05 0.30 0.17 0.26 0.11 0.62 
 2030  0.01 0.02 0.15 0.27 0.38 0.17 0.72 
 
0.07 0.04 0.24 0.19 0.32 0.15 0.74 
 2040  0.00 0.02 0.10 0.27 0.42 0.19 0.76 
 
0.04 0.03 0.17 0.20 0.37 0.18 0.78 
 2050  0.00 0.01 0.06 0.26 0.45 0.21 0.77 
 
0.02 0.02 0.11 0.20 0.42 0.21 0.80 
Van 
 2010  0.07 0.15 0.24 0.31 0.18 0.06 0.34 
 
0.31 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.08 0.02 0.15 
 2020  0.04 0.15 0.20 0.26 0.27 0.09 0.49 
 
0.22 0.25 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.05 0.29 
 2030  0.02 0.12 0.15 0.27 0.32 0.12 0.59 
 
0.15 0.24 0.13 0.20 0.19 0.09 0.42 
 2040  0.01 0.09 0.11 0.28 0.36 0.15 0.69 
 
0.10 0.19 0.10 0.24 0.25 0.12 0.55 
 2050  0.01 0.07 0.07 0.27 0.40 0.18 0.74 
 
0.07 0.15 0.07 0.26 0.30 0.15 0.66 
Note: Education categories: E1: No Education; E2: Incomplete Primary; E3: Completed primary; E4: Completed lower secondary; E5: Completed upper Secondary; E6: Tertiary 
Table 8. Education distribution by sex among population aged 15 and above and for 20-39 years old under 3-Child scenario
31 
 
The education level of the demographic aged 20-39 years old is crucial for 
future developments in human capital since the 20-39 age-group has been shown to be 
an important predictor of economic growth (Lutz, Crespo Cuaresma & Sanderson, 
2008). As can be seen in Figure 9, the differences in the proportions are clear among the 
three scenarios. It can be seen that at the beginning (in 2010), the inequality in this 
education level is large for both sexes in selected provinces. However, as expected, the 
heterogeneity between the provinces is much larger for the female population than in for 
the male population. Under the Euro scenario, this inequity diminishes significantly 
compared to other two scenarios.  
 
 
Figure 9. The proportions with at least upper secondary completed for population aged 
20-39 in the five selected provinces between 2010 and 2050 by the Euro, Medium, and 
3-Child scenarios.  
4. Discussion 
Our main objective of this study was to explore the effect of scenarios based on future 
changes in policies or events on the size and the structure of the population in five 
selected provinces that are representative of four fertility regions of Turkey. We 
identified three storylines for the future that are likely, namely: “Euro”, “Medium”, and 
“3-Child”. We operationalized these storylines in terms of future fertility, life 
expectancies, migration rates and education progression. While doing so, we paid 
attention to the fact that some policies or events might heterogeneously affect different 
provinces.  
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In this study, we took advantage of the multi-state projection model that was 
developed during the 1970s at the IIASA, originating from a geographic perspective in 
which states were defined to be regions of a country (Keyfitz, 1985; Lutz & KC, 2011; 
Rogers & Land, 1982); later this method was extensively improved for modelling 
changes in educational attainment as discussed in the methodology section. Using this 
model, we produced results of the projection of the population by age-sex-education for 
five provinces and showed how their future size and structure change differently under 
different scenarios and that these results can be used for policy making and planning. 
Presumably, the most interesting finding of this study is the impact of different 
policies or conditions on future demography and human capital. One of the findings of 
this exercise is that fertility and internal migration are the most important factors 
contributing to the change in the regional population size and structure. Mortality has a 
moderate impact and international migration has the least effect mainly due to a very 
low level of initial values - derived from UN estimates (Abel, 2013). In provinces where 
the current rate of internal migration is already high, the impact of fertility and internal 
migration is significant on population size and structure. In the case of Van, very high 
fertility levels under the 3-Child scenario would have brought the population to increase 
significantly if it were not for an internal migration that flushes young people out to 
provinces such as Ankara and Izmir. The receiving province’s population rises much 
faster due to this internal migration of young people, and the population will further 
increase by the way giving births by female migrants. Turkey is a very interesting case 
where regional demographic development is emblematic of larger geopolitical entities, 
be they at the European level or at the world level. The future outlook in terms regional 
population therefore mainly depends on fertility and internal migration and the 
implications of these changes. 
With development, the rate of internal migration is more likely to grow than 
remain stable or decline. With a huge number of people migrating internally, the impact 
on demographics and on socio-economics will be important to assess. This has 
implications for social infrastructure such as urbanization, housing, transportation 
system, living arrangements, healthcare, education, left behind population, brain drain 
in the regions losing people among many others. Regarding the recent past experience, 
the high rate of internal migration in Turkey lead to an increase in the housing deficit as 
well as socio-economic and spatial segregation of some migrant groups in highly 
urbanized cities in western regions such as Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara (Güvenç, 1998; 
Işık, 2009; Pınarcioğlu & Işık, 2009; Yüceşahin & Tuysuz, 2011). On the other hand, 
research has shown that in places where people have left labour force shortage, 
impoverishment and unemployment rates increase as seen in underdeveloped eastern 
and south-eastern regions of the country (Yüceşahin & Özgür, 2008). All these are the 
contributing factors to continuing variability between the regions. Hence, it is a high 
time to conduct serious studies on these issues and to assess whether policies are 
needed. 
In our model, international migration is a very weak demographic force which 
might be due to a lack of real data. International migration is a big issue in European 
countries. High levels of tensions exist in European countries where some political 
parties get their votes by selling the fear that Europe will be taken over by migrants 
from Turkey, particularly if Turkey joins the EU. What we see in our calculation is that 
given the current level of international migration, and if it doubles under Euro scenario, 
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such a fear seems to be simple hoax to cash on ballet. However, we note that under the 
Euro scenario, the rate of international migration could increase by manifold as 
experienced from new members of EU from eastern European countries. This is likely 
as a very large Turkish population is already settled in current EU countries such as 
Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands, and Turkey joining the EU will facilitate further 
migration westward. 
Regarding fertility, our scenarios show different trends in fertility behaviour for 
the near future. Under the Euro scenario, Turkey’s integration with the EU is likely to 
affect the fertility behaviour of the Turkish population. In general, we expect the 
fertility to decline very rapidly due to several reasons; firstly, integration means a flow 
of Turkish migrants to the other European countries (therefore, high rate of international 
migration) mainly for the labour reasons. More women will get into the labour force 
within the country and the educational attainment of the whole country will increase 
resulting in a massive effort to improve education levels throughout the country, 
especially in the regions where the current level of development is very low. All these 
factors will push overall fertility downwards. Therefore, we assume that fertility will 
further decline in all provinces and eventually converge at the level of 1.75. Under the 
Medium scenario, which is a bit less optimistic than the Euro scenario; the decline in 
fertility will be slower. 
Under 3-Child scenario, Turkish society will become more traditional as a result 
of rising political and religious conservatism. On the one hand Turkey is in Europe with 
an ambition to be in the EU, and on the other hand Turkey is a neighbour to many not so 
stable Arab and central-Asian countries. We expect that fertility level in the regions 
with higher fertility will converge to a level of 2.5 (TFR) as a result of the government’s 
push towards the target. In low fertility regions, we assume that the fertility will decline 
a bit to a level of 1.5 and increase to a level of 2.0. The demand for reproductive health 
care related services and basic education will be much higher than in Euro scenario. 
Hence, pressure will be higher in increasing the quantity of services than the quality. In 
the Euro scenario, with less demand more focus will be placed on the quality of services 
or on tertiary levels of services. 
The projections also revealed inevitable ageing in the society in terms of the 
proportion of people above age 65 in the population. However, when one considers the 
human capital of the older population, the population is more educated which implies 
that they would be much healthier in physical and cognitive terms than their older 
cohorts. However, the increase in quantity results in an increased demand in healthcare 
services and governments (local and national) should start preparing plans and policies 
(healthcare, living arrangement). Will migrants return to their place of birth? Should we 
need to build more hospitals in provinces such as Van? Our results imply that the 
population of the country in selected provinces will increase in the near term, however, 
in the long run this may not hold true. The age structure of human capital is particularly 
important for countries in the period of socio-economic, cultural and political 
transitions. Research has shown that when better educated large cohorts enter the young 
adult ages they play a central role in the transformation of societies through the modern 
democracy (Lutz & KC, 2011; Lutz, Cuaresma & Abbasi-Shavazi, 2010). Due to 
inevitable increase in the population of Turkey in the near future, Turkey’s ongoing 
demographic opportunity window will continue and will gain much more importance in 
impacting the socio-economic transformation of Turkish society.   
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Our model and its findings presented in this study could be conceptualized and 
concluded as future prospective regional convergence or divergence in the country. 
Development is a social, economic, and political concept expressed in the lives of 
people in places or regions and thus this term is usually defined as higher levels of 
education, income, health, political or social participation. Demographic transition 
theory suggests that development broadly conceived should tend to lower fertility and 
shift the incidence of mortality from young to the very old, as health and service access 
and technology rise (Morrill, 1993). Infant mortality rates should decline, the proportion 
of births to particularly young mothers should decrease since women and in general 
people receive more education. Thus, individuals postpone marriage, and participate 
more fully in the labour force.  
Although the term ‘human capital’ briefly emphasizes the importance of both 
education and health of people, education has a privileged role in every aspect of 
progress in human development. Research has shown that almost in all societies better 
educated individuals have lower mortality rates and their children have better chances of 
survival and more education tends to imply a healthier and better-nourished population 
(Lutz & KC, 2011; Lutz, 2009). Education is also an important determinant for a wide 
range of demographic behaviour of individuals, as it powerfully affects fertility, 
mortality and migration (Bongaarts, 2010; Jejeebhoy, 1995; KC et al., 2010). This effect 
of education on fertility is particularly apparent in countries or regions that have clear 
differences among its regions (Bongaarts, 2003; Jejeebhoy, 1995; Morrill, 1993). This 
picture fits well in case of Turkey. These spatial patterns and relationships between the 
demographics and societal education level raise certain questions, as in this study, about 
whether or to what extent modest increases in education, especially among females, will 
lead to differences in demographic behaviour and particularly for the future human 
capital (Lutz, Goujon & Wils, 2008).  
Figure 10 depicts the demographic situation with factors that might either 
advance or retard geographic convergence between representative provinces in Turkey. 
As can be understood from the Figure 10, faster and more sustainable economic and 
social development is undoubtedly related to a higher level of education, income and 
being in a healthier environment. In these circumstances, higher levels of life 
expectancies, income convergence, faster educational achievement and thus increased 
attainment to universal basic education would be achievable targets in the short run. If 
development tends to converge over time, then so should demographic character due to 
fertility decreases, technological progress in educational and health systems and 
increases in life expectancy. Our “Euro” and partly “Medium” scenarios identified in 
this study coincide with this type of transition. However, we expect faster transition 
under Euro than Medium.  
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Figure 10. Forces for convergence and divergence in demographic character under the 
“Euro”, “Medium”, and “3-Child” scenarios. 
Note: The figure is prepared by inspiration from Morrill (1993). 
On the other hand, Morrill (1993) stated that such a transition may not occur 
simultaneously or in the same form across countries, regions, or nations. This is the 
basic origin behind imbalances, continuing variability or diverging trends among world 
regions. At this point our 3-Child Scenario is suitable to simulate continuing 
demographic variability among the representative provinces for future developments 
and human capital. As can be seen from the figures 7, 8, and 9, under the 3-Child 
scenario the gap between the provinces will persist. It would be important to pay 
attention to the variability of the proportions with at least higher secondary completed 
for the population aged 20-39 under the three scenarios in selected provinces (Figure 9). 
The education of this age-group has been shown to be an important predictor of 
economic growth particularly for the future (Lutz, Crespo Cuaresma & Sanderson, 
2008). 
In conclusion, this kind of scenario analysis will present policy makers a better 
projected picture of alternative future of Turkey and therefore will be highly useful in 
making policy decisions. We therefore recommend to expand the current exercise to the 
whole of Turkey to integrate other disciplines in a system analysis approach. The result 
of this exercise reveals the extent that Turkey’s population could evolve in the future 
and provides policy makers and planners a tool to look into the future and test the 
implication of certain policies and expectations on the development of population. 
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